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81 
JUSTICE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: A 
REFLECTION ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: NOMOS LI. Edited by 
Melissa S. Williams,1 Rosemary Nagy2 and John Elster.3 
New York, New York University Press. 2011. Pp. xiv + 367. 
$60.00 (cloth). 
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin4 
Transitional Justice as a motif, a discourse and a practice 
continues to entice analysis from scholars, practitioners and 
policy makers. It is a field that has rapidly expanded, and that 
has both the fortune and disadvantage of being termed an 
“industry.” The growth of transitional justice is both an 
opportunity and a warning, as the challenges raised by massive 
human rights violations and transitions from violence to peace or 
from repressive regimes to more liberal ones continue to 
preoccupy scholars and practitioners. Each new country specific 
context facilitates revisiting old trade-offs and concepts revealing 
new elements to transitional dilemmas. 
In a collection edited by Melissa Williams, Rosemary Nagy 
and John Elster entitled Transitional Justice, a substantial 
attempt is made by a number of contributors to engage with 
theoretical and conceptual understandings of transitional justice, 
as well as to reflect comprehensively on the conceptual 
dimensions of selected transitional justice measures. The book is 
the product of the annual meeting of the American Society for 
Legal and Political Philosophy, in conjunction with the 
American Political Science Association, in 2005, but only 
 
 1. Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto. 
 2. Assistant Professor of Gender Equality and Social Justice, Nipissing University 
in Ontario, Canada. 
 3. Professor of Rationalité et sciences sociale, Collège de France, and Robert K. 
Merton Professor of Social Sciences, Columbia University. 
 4. Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School; Dorsey & Whitney Chair in Law, 
University of Minnesota Law School; and Associate Director, Transitional Justice 
Institute, University of Ulster, Northern Ireland. 
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brought to publication in 2011. With a self-confessed theoretical 
bent, vividly captured in the contribution by David Dyzenhaus 
entitled “Leviathan as a Theory of Transitional Justice,” the 
essay collection contributes to the on-going theorization of the 
transitional justice field and there are some significant nuggets to 
be pulled out of its pages. However there is also some patchiness 
in the collection, with some variance in the strength and depth of 
contributions and thus their overall conceptual cohesiveness. 
The opening essay, “Theorizing Transitional Justice,” is by 
Pablo de Greiff, the recently appointed United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and 
guarantees of non-repetition and practitioner of transitional 
justice, as well as Director of Research for the New York based 
International Centre for Transitional Justice. The essay is 
derived from de Greiff”s reflections on the under-
conceptualized state of the field, his assessment of the limitations 
of other theory-oriented contributions, as well as his own 
theoretical contribution, seeking to cohere theoretical 
approaches to the analysis of transitional justice. De Greiff 
relays an emerging “common sense” around transitional justice 
practice, which one can take to mean greater convergence 
between all those engaged in writing and practice on the 
contours, imperatives and dimensions of the field. His 
preoccupations are driven in part by an identifiable frustration 
with piecemeal or “pick and choose” transition, whereby states 
and international institutions think that different parts of the 
transitional justice “package” can be traded off against one 
another. Instead he argues for a normative conception of 
transitional justice, the contents of which are advanced in this 
essay. In particular, he makes strong claims for relationships 
between the constituent elements of transitional justice, yielding 
in his terminology a “holistic” vision. De Greiff does so because 
he argues that normative theoretical work can guide action, and 
operate to make practical choices clearer or give their 
problematic elements greater exposure. Essential to his task is 
the identification of “two mediate goals, namely recognition and 
civic trust and two final goals, reconciliation and democracy . . .” 
(pp. 33-34). He frames his overall argument by the claim that 
these four goals in tandem “[g]ive concrete expression through 
law-based systems to the necessarily more abstract notion of 
justice” (p. 34). De Greiff also attempts to mediate a middle 
ground through the contradictory views of transitional justice as 
comprising either “extraordinary” justice on the one hand, or 
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merely constituting an untidy set of political compromises on the 
other.5 De Greiff”s analysis devises some new and thoughtful 
ground and there is both appealing turn of phrase and fresh 
insight into well-trodden problems of addressing grievous human 
rights violations in fraught political circumstances. He is 
pragmatic on the limited reach of many transitional justice 
mechanisms, operating as they do “in a very imperfect world.” 
His claim to the value of understanding a variety of transitional 
justice mechanisms (truth telling, accountability, reparations, 
and memory) as inter-connected resonates with the challenges 
that other observers make as to the restrictions that follow from 
a singular approach to transitional work. This echoes the 
selection of the negative relations identified by Elster in Chapter 
2, as he pinpoints the challenges of undertaking one kind of 
transitional measure (truth) with the balancing of another 
(failure to identify wrongdoers or offer reparations) (p. 94). 
A number of the chapters in this book take a highly 
pragmatic approach to assessing the success or failure of 
transitional justice as an entity or its constituent parts. In this 
vein, Adrian Vermeule’s analysis of “Reparations as Rough 
Justice,” which opens by rehearsing the philosophical and policy 
objects to reparations, yet sympathetically suggests and explains 
why “there is a widely shared intuition or complex set of 
intuitions underpinning the persistent demand for compensatory 
reparations programs” (p. 151). These intuitions are captured by 
the deft insight that while rough justice may be broadly 
indefensible, it is attractive only when compared to no justice. 
Vermeule’s instincts here pair him closely with Elster in a very 
pragmatic alignment that is readily identifiable to those 
operating at the cold face of transition—namely that the perfect 
transition is rarely available and that “[p]reference satisfaction is 
not the yardstick by which ordinary people judge [in this case a 
monetary award]” (p. 154). Vermeule’s analysis, though concen-
trating on reparations, speaks to a broader range of transitional 
justice trade-offs, where many of the mechanisms available to 
victims would not really be defensible according to “any first-
best normative criterion,” but that the “status quo is even less 
 
 5. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 761 (2004). Notably, David Dyzenhaus’ contribution to this collection is 
also framed by a skepticism that there is a “distinct field of inquiry” in transitional 
justice, and that one should think of “transitional regimes as exceptions to our ordinary 
theory of justice,” leading in his view to a third and doubtful premise “that the societies 
in which most theorists of transitional justice live are the societies that transitional 
regimes should aim to emulate in most respects” (p. 182).  
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morally defensible, assuming that one can coherently speak of 
comparisons and matters of degree in such things” (p. 154). 
The preoccupation with reparations and compensation is 
picked up in Debra Satz’s contribution, “Countering the Wrongs 
of the Past: The Role of Compensation.” This essay has a pithy 
and uncontroversial start, articulating the instinctive view that 
individual demands for repair can vary, and “responses that 
might be appropriate in one situation might not be appropriate 
in another” (p. 129). The essay is mostly concerned with the 
ethical and philosophical concerns that follow from the giving 
(or receipt) of monetary compensation, and well as problems of 
identification where the harm in question has been experienced 
historically and is not a recent occurrence for those claiming the 
harm. While Satz is certainty right in saying that the standard 
welfare economist’s view of compensation is the one most 
appealed to in many conversations about repairing historical 
wrong, this reader was not convinced that in practice this is 
where the gravest tensions lie as regards contemporary 
transitions grappling with reparations. Indeed, a robust literature 
and practice of group, communal, symbolic and development-
integrated reparations is to be found in multiple sites 
underscoring much greater innovation in legal and political 
practice than the essay captures.6 Doubtlessly, in the context of 
U.S. positioning relating to Native American or African 
American slavery reparations the debate remains largely stifled 
and concentrated on the sterile pros and cons of lump sum 
financial compensation. Acknowledging that should not limit us 
to viewing the theoretical space of monetary compensation 
through the prims of these specific cases alone, or to frame other 
cases out from them. Arguably, a slice of the innovative practices 
and pragmatic choices being made in fragile and economically 
limited post-conflict sites may have the capacity to circle back to 
the cases that seem to underpin Satz’s analysis. 
 
 6. See, e.g., THE REDRESS TRUST, IMPLEMENTING VICTIMS’ RIGHTS: A HANDBOOK ON 
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES ON THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY AND REPARATION 
(1996), http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/Reparation%20Principles. pdf; Ruth 
Rubio- Marín & Pablo de Greiff, Women and Reparations, 1 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 
318 (2007); Colleen Duggan et al., Reparations for Sexual and Reproductive Violence: 
Prospects for Achieving Gender Justice in Guatemala and Peru, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL 
JUST. 192 (2008); Brandon Hamber & Ingrid Palmary, Gender, Memorialization and 
Symbolic Reparations, in THE GENDER OF REPARATIONS: UNSETTLING SEXUAL 
HIERARCHIES WHILE REDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 324 (Ruth Rubio-
Marín ed., 2009). 
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Satz’s essay undertakes some graceful analytical work in 
addressing why the assumptions that individual satisfaction can 
be aggregated into a single scale are misplaced. Here the 
assumptions are misdirected not least because victims may view 
their harms as incommensurable to other goods, that the 
obligation to compensate disconnects in unacceptable ways the 
wrong done from the wrongdoer, or that the relational nature of 
the harm is not fully revealed by the compensation offered. 
There is, whether in this work or other, some significant space 
left to explore why and by what pathway symbolic and 
communal reparations allow for satisfaction to victims in ways 
that financial compensation does not. It is generally agreed that 
victims need both practical reparations for and symbolic 
acknowledgement of their experiences. Both are necessary to 
achieve a cohesive, unitary and structurally engaged response to 
harm. Symbolic reparations can undo stigma, remake citizenship 
and social status, and provide a formal lasting testament to 
deeply felt harm. But we should we wary of seeing symbolic 
reparations as a full substitute for individualized monetary and 
social benefits to victims. Tangible benefits without societal and 
state acknowledgment marginalize the victim politically and 
socially. 
Moreover, any reflection on symbolic and group benefits 
must also engage in a meaningful way with the intersectionalities 
of victim status. There is a danger that by a failure to 
disaggregate certain kinds of harms, we ignore the re-inscribing 
of victim stigma in unexpected ways. These challenges are most 
obviously in view as we assess gender harms and the reparations 
that may follow to women as a result. Here there is an odd 
circularity in that if the harm to be remedied is a sexual harm or 
violation, it is premised in part on the presumed values of virtue 
and purity for the female body and person in a given social 
setting. There is self-evidently an autonomy and dignitary harm 
to sexual violation but in some measure the stigma that is 
remedied through symbolic recognition or compensation is 
rooted in a measure of acceptance of social role and 
stratification (all the more so in societies where marriage, 
childbearing and social status are premised on religiously 
mandated purity and mediated access to the female body). In the 
rush to ensure remedy and reparation, we should also pay 
attention to the side-costs, namely the affirmation of the very set 
of values which, in part contribute to the causalities of harm, for 
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example, to female bodies in highly divided or conflicted 
polities. 
Satz further explores the work of Janna Thompson and her 
views of reparations as a form of redeeming intergenerational 
ties and obligation (pp. 141-45). The time is well spent—and 
affirms that the theory is one that deserves greater scrutiny by 
transitional justice scholars broadly defined. Despite some 
quibbles with some aspects of Thompson’s claims, Satz generally 
finds attractive the notion that claims by later generations to 
remedy, premised on the suffering and harms of earlier 
generations, have currency, because these claims are understood 
as “means to reestablish relationships of mutual respect among 
persons and groups whose relationships have been severely 
damaged by past denials of that respect” (p. 144). 
The preliminary exploration here opens up as many 
questions and it seeks to unwind. In particular, it begs important 
process inquiries in how the determination of harms to be passed 
on and harms that are left behind and forgotten within victim 
communities come about.7 There are self-evidently internal 
equities and inequalities in operation, as process of memory 
preservation and absent memory are deployed to select out from 
any particular traumatic moment(s) what is remembered and 
held and what is not.8 These questions of selectivity are 
importantly connected with the dynamics of “outsider-insiders” 
in victims communities: what harms do groups and communities 
extend collective ownership over and which may be excluded 
precisely because the targeted victim is a marginal or demonized 
figure (for example the violated woman, the GLBT victim, the 
politically marginal)? Here the construction of historical 
memory and its connection to reparations offers an opportunity 
to simultaneously acknowledge the present memory and reclaim 
the absent memory of the marginalized victims. Any such 
process is likely a fraught one given the prerogatives of 
communal ownership of historical and intergenerational 
memory. A further challenge that emerges from the foray to 
discuss intergenerational memory, is related to the relationship 
that emerges between external political and “guardian” 
communities to the successor communities that may lay claim to 
 
 7. Marianne Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory, 29 POETICS TODAY 103 
(2008).  
 8. See Kris Brown, ‘What It Was Like to Live Through a Day’: Transitional Justice 
and the Memory of the Everyday in a Divided Society, 6 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 444 
(2012). 
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the status of contemporary victimhood. A stellar example of this 
kind of layered analysis is Allan”s exploration of the complexity 
embodied in Palestinian memory for present-day refugees living 
in Lebanon, identifying the ways in which there are perceptible 
divisions between older and living embodiment victims of land 
displacement (those who actually remember or experienced) and 
subsequent generations whose identity is connected to present 
political and geographical space, and who uncomfortably inherit 
the ownership of the intergenerational harm.9 Framed within an 
analysis of the instrumentalization of memory in the Shatila 
refugee camp, the reflection explores the tensions between 
“[c]ommemorative events [that] . . . consolidated nationalist 
claims by the refugees . . .” but simultaneously occlude “from 
view are the everyday forms of suffering experienced by 
refugees and emergent subjectivities not conforming to the 
communitarian ideals of nationalism.”10 The essay thus opens up 
a wide and deep space for transitional justice scholars to tease 
apart the intergenerational inheritance and to probe its 
complexity and contours, both empirically and theoretically. 
In a chapter that deals with the nitty gritty of transitional 
justice at the cold face, “When More May be Less: Transitional 
Justice in East Timor,” David Cohen & Leigh-Ashley Lipscomb, 
assesses the success of transitional justice measures in East 
Timor. The essay nicely frames its arguments in terms of the two 
competing visions of transitional justice articulated in the 
volume. On the one hand, Jon Elster’s contention that one 
should not necessarily view each core objective of transitional 
justice as “synchronous and complementary,” set up against 
Pablo de Grieff’s theory of transitional justice that proposes an 
holistic application of transitional justice measures, where deep 
coordination and overlap is actively sought and valued through 
the transitional phase. In situating their analysis in East Timor, a 
post-conflict locale in which multiple transitional justice systems 
came into play simultaneously, the chapter undertakes the 
difficult task of applying the theory to practice. They make the 
strong empirical claim that because of the peculiar circumstances 
of the transition in East Timor, where sovereignty had largely 
been ceded to the United Nations, it may be one of the best 
situations to make meaningful assessments of an holistic 
approach to the multi-pronged implementation of transitional 
 
 9. Diana Allan, Commemorative Economies and the Politics of Solidarity in Shatila 
Camp, 4 HUMANITY 133, 136 (2013). 
 10. Id. 
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justice measures. East Timor was a place in which there was an 
intensity of investment in transitional justice measures. Their 
core claim, borne out by a painstaking review of criminal 
process, truth recovery process and other complimentary 
measures, is that “more may actually mean less if scare resources 
are dispersed rather than concentrated” (p. 257). In their view, 
the addition of multiple transitional justice institutions, one 
layered on the other, may not have led to better justice outcomes 
(or perceptions) for victims, but produced unsatisfactory results 
for many of the central stakeholders. 
In the context of criminal trials, their pithy review of the 
pitfalls of East Timor’s domestic prosecutions (the Jakarta ad 
hoc human rights courts) show the undisputable challenges of 
the lack of competence by local courts and legal actors managing 
the application of international crimes (e.g., crimes against 
humanity), but more tellingly illustrate how difficult it is for 
justice institutions to let go of the institutional values inculcated 
by the previous regime. This seepage effect profoundly limits the 
capacity of successor regimes (or more directly their legal 
institutions) to do justice for the crimes of the former. These 
insights, while not entirely new, are revealed in fresh ways 
through the working through of ideas in a specific site which 
shows the precise effect on old institutions operating “new” 
practices, the blockages by entrenched institutional elites little 
affected by accountability for past violations, and the limited 
reach of civil society and international organizations to 
fundamentally affect outcomes. The message is sobering for any 
undue optimism on the reach of transitional justice. 
Cold face exploration is also in play in the sole empirical 
contribution to the collection—the essay by Monika Nalepa, 
“Reconciliation, Refugee Returns, and the Impact of 
International Criminal Justice: The Case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.” The essay is placed with a stated lacunae of the 
limits of political science to clearly establish “whether and how 
criminal prosecutions can contribute to what is arguably the 
highest goal of transitional justice institutions: reconciliation” (p. 
317).11 To answer that question the chapter employs the methods 
 
 11. Whether this lacunae is as deep as the author identified, with the recent 
publications of large-scale comparative study of the relationship between criminal 
accountability and rule of law, is an open question. See KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE 
CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 
(2011); TRICIA D. OLSEN ET AL., TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN BALANCE: COMPARING 
PROCESSES, WEIGHING EFFICACY (2010). 
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of empirical political science, analysing the distinct patterns of 
refugee returns in two municipalities that were the site of 
egregious human rights violations during the disintegration of 
the Former Yugoslavia (specially Prijedor and Srebenica). These 
two sites are chosen specifically because close analysis by the 
author of the prosecution strategies of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
demonstrated different prosecutorial strategies in dealing with 
suspected war criminals in both municipalities. The analysis is 
well couched in the caveats that make sense—namely that there 
may be other factors in play in both sites that inject or depress 
the capacity to “do” reconciliation. There is useful and 
important data findings in the study that deserve the attention of 
international criminal lawyers and those interested in theorizing 
from a legal perspective on supra-national legal justice. Her 
conclusion that “the price of plea-bargaining in order to 
reconstruct the chain of command and reach order-giving 
perpetrators depresses reconciliation” though having an 
instinctive (as well as empirical) quality is a valuable one (p. 
317). That noted, the presumptions concerning reconciliation as 
a valued or presumed goal of transition itself remain somewhat 
under-tested in the analysis. Nalepa makes a nod to this 
challenge in affirming the empirical difficulties in deciding how 
to conceptualize reconciliation as a measurable empirical 
phenomenon. Her view that the modest position of focusing on 
the return of refugees itself as a measure of “reconciliation,” 
thereby viewing return itself as fulfilling some measure of social 
trust and cooperation across ethnic lines may be more ambitious 
that the author acknowledges. Specifically, it presumes a set of 
real choices for refugees, and that the absence of violence and 
fear sufficient to return to a home (which may be a better choice 
than a tent, or an inadequate crowded and shared social housing 
provided as the mainstay of refugee resettlement) is tantamount 
to some measure of social trust. As the rich exploration of 
Kimberly Theidon, tackling the complexity of return and 
community existence in the aftermath of Shining Path and 
Peruvian state sponsored violence, reveals,12 living together in 
the aftermath of deadly communal violence may be many 
things—but it is generally not reconciliation. 
 
 12. KIMBERLY THEIDON, INTIMATE ENEMIES: VIOLENCE AND RECONCILIATION 
IN PERU (2013). 
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CONCLUSION 
The essay collection carries a cacophony of new and old 
voices to the transitional justice conversation. Its value lies in the 
nuance and reflectiveness of a number of the contributions, the 
capacity to tease out word and concept in a painstaking and 
thorough way. There are inter-disciplinary strengths and 
communications of substance across disciplinary lines, though in 
a sense that may prevent some of the best of the analysis being 
fully heard within the terrains of the disciplines that would most 
benefit from a diverse set of voices on the new and old 
challenges of transitional justice. 
For a diverse collection of ideas, one missing piece was the 
absence of critical and non-mainstream voices from any of the 
disciplinary contributions in the collection. There is much 
greater expression of critical left, situated, post-colonial, site 
specific and feminist voices to be garnered across many of the 
disciplinary engagements with transitional justice than are 
revealed in this collection. The majority of the voices repre-
sented here are those of the western / non-transitional “here” 
speaking to the experiences and choices of the non-western, 
“othered” there. The challenge is not only theoretical, but 
compounded by the fact that an uncritical and narrowly liberal 
conception of the transition directs our gaze away from the 
cultural, material and geo-political sites in which transitional 
justice practices have emerged. In simple terms, the sites 
transitional justice most often engage are the exotic other of 
locales, subjects, conflicts and repressions elsewhere (never in 
the western “here”). The export of rule of law and transitional 
justice discourse can reflexively deploy an uncritical, liberal, and 
hierarchical positioning with little capacity to recognize its own 
hegemony and privilege.13 Transitional justice discourse, in all its 
standard forms and straightjackets, demands critical 
interrogation. Specifically, seeing transitional justice as a form of 
discursive colonization whereby its language and “tool box” 
appropriate and codify knowledge in ways that exclude and 
produce hierarchies of value through the course of political 
transition should be recognized.14 A fully articulated postcolonial 
 
 13. On rule of law exports and the challenges for women in particular, see 
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Michael Hamilton, Gender and the Rule of Law in Transitional 
Societies, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 380 (2009). 
 14. See Christine Bell, Colm Campbell & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, The Battle for 
Transitional Justice: Hegemony, Iraq, and International Law, in JUDGES, TRANSITION, 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 147 (Morison, et al. eds., 2007). 
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challenge to the hegemonic reach of legal liberalism as repre-
sented by mainstream transitional justice has yet to emerge,15 but 
any fulsome theoretical analysis should be cognizant of this 
critique’s relevance. It is the absence of any such alternative 
articulations to the subjective experience and conceptualization 
of transitional justice that leave a distinct gap in an otherwise 
generally erudite and thoughtful set of contributions. 
 
 
 15. For an early articulation of what such an approach would encompass see 
Khanya 
sela Moyo, Feminism, Postcolonial Legal Theory and Transitional Justice: A Critique of 
Current Trends, 1 INT’L HUM. RTS. L. REV. 237 (2012). 
